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ARMED CONFLICTS IN AFRICA: 
FRAGILE STATES AND RISING INSTABILITY
This article will analyze the dynamics of armed conflicts in Africa from the per-
spective of fragile states. The text is divided into two parts. The first part (by 
JVdB) provides a purview of civil wars, border wars and armed insurrections 
mostly focusing on Southern and Central Africa. The second part (by JR) will 
take closer look at the risks and dynamics of terrorism, so far limited to Northern 
and West Africa. All analyzed conflicts focus on the most recent developments of 
2016 and will provide short-term and medium-term scenarios on their possible 
evolution.
In Part 1 will break open the “black box” of these ‘failed states’ by distinguishing 
between their structural causes. According to C. T. Call’s works, the text will differ-
entiate between a ‘legitimacy gap’ – the rejection by the political elites and society of 
“the rules regulating the exercise of power and the accumulation and distribution of 
wealth;” a ‘capacity gap’ – the degree that state institutions are unable to provide or 
regulate the minimal provision of core public goods; and a ‘security gap’ – The condi-
tion when states do not provide minimal levels of security in face of organized armed 
groups (Call, 2008, 2011; Van den Bosch, 2016).
Part 2 focuses on the basic preconditions for the activities of the major ter-
rorist organizations in Africa. With emphasis on the importance of the north-east 
and north-west regions of this continent in context of terrorist threats. Hence the 
initial focus was put on Somalia, which as a permanent fragile state remains under 
the increased influence of the Jihadist organization Al Shabaab, which is an or-
ganization with a high potential for increased capacity in the coming years. Next, 
was sketched out the situation in Egypt, considering, in essence, the activity of 
the so-called Islamic State in Sinai Peninsula. In this Analysis it also pointed to 
the intricate internal situation in modern Libya after so-called Arab Spring and 
international military intervention, where, despite earlier appearances, the terror-
ist threat was too much positioned, mostly by comprised to the internal conflict 
between the different Libyan political parties. Finally, efforts were made to il-
lustrate the current terrorist activity in the Mali area, highlighting the importance 
of Al Qaeda branch AQIM and the situation in Nigeria where Boko Haram group 
operates.
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PART I: ARMED CONFLICTS IN AFRICA: 
FRAGILE STATES, INSURRECTIONS & BORDER WARS
Smoldering Civil War in the Central African Republic
The conflict in the CAR broke out after a loose rebel alliance or northern ethnic groups, 
Séléka (meaning ‘alliance’ in Sango) challenged the government of François Bozizé in 
late 2012, finally overthrowing him in March 2013. The rebel advance was followed 
by sectarian ethnic cleansing between northern Muslim militias and southern, riverine 
Christian communities, which in turn mobilized in various Anti-balaka militias. The 
CAR has followed the path of the DRC, in which entrenched personalist rule has hol-
lowed out the state, resulting in the loss of the state’s monopoly of violence over its 
territory and opening the gates for foreign predation. Elite conflict spilled over into 
communal conflict, which in turn led to a complete breakdown of the rule of law, lead-
ing to the further criminalization of many parts of the state, enforcing local conflicts 
and creating new ones.
Before losing power, a battered Bozizé had taken on a constructive attitude vis-à-vis 
the international mediation attempts between his regime and opposition forces. From 
2004 to 2008 a wave of conflict and attempted coups had broken out against his re-
gime. State security forces, various rebel groups and road bandits all committed sys-
temic violence against civilians, especially in the northeast. In need of foreign support, 
Bozizé had agreed to democratize, but did not intend to release power. In 2010 he 
postponed elections twice, but managed to win 64% of the vote. The elections were 
deemed free and fair, despite irregularities, a very low frequency, and the protests of 
the opposition. When violence broke out once more the international community be-
came more critical toward Bozizé, but more crucial was the loss of Idriss Déby, presi-
dent of Chad, as his ally. Déby was afraid that Séléka would link up with opponents 
of his regime residing in the CAR. As he withdrew his troops, the Séléka rebels were 
finally able to take Bangui in March 2013, forcing Bozizé to flee (Herbert et al., 2013; 
AIP, 2014; ACLED, 2015).
The CAR has had become an increasingly failing state (Call, 2008, 2011) as the 
stubborn consequent legitimacy gaps deepened the existing capacity gap and finally 
led to a severe security gap that even the current transitional government is not able 
to mend. For its inception, the CAR has been under personalist rule, with only one 
knows peaceful transfer of power since independence (Ange-Félix Patassé in 1993). 
The violent sectarian conflict that broke out in 2012 is the culmination of this legacy of 
structural exclusion and inequality. The country’s ruling groups, dominated by ethnic 
riverine groups until 2003, started as broad ethnic coalitions, but became increasingly 
exclusive as state resources dwindled and patronage networks shrunk (Cederman et 
al., 2005).
When Bozizé overthrew the (only) democratic regime of Patassé in 2003, the new 
ruling coalition was dominated by the Baya ethnic group, coopting some other minor 
groups from the northern and riverine regions. After Séléka took over in 2013, rebel 
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leader Michel Am-Nondokro Djotodia’s1 main support base were the Muslim Runga, 
a very small ethnic group (comprising about 21,500 people) that had not been a politi-
cal force in CAR politics before 2005 (Cederman et al., 2005; CAR CSG, 2011: 42). 
After taking the presidency, Djotodia disbanded the (predominantly) Muslim rebel 
movement that brought him to power, letting his militias (among them many merce-
naries from Chad and Sudan) to pillage and terrorize the population on a massive scale. 
Since the population in the southern, riverine provinces was mostly Christian, they 
set up their own (anti-balaka) militias completing the spiral of violence (McCormick, 
2013). As noted in the research of McCauley (2014), sectarian mobilization can be 
extremely violent is ethnic and religious identities overlap, which happened in case of 
the Séléka and anti-balaka militias.
Five days after the coup, warring militias left at least 600 dead. In light of this 
swift deterioration The UNSC remained hesitant to intervene with a multilateral 
peace enforcement operation, but still the Security Council gave the green light to 
France, CAR’s former colonizer, which was willing to intervene (Resolution 2127, 
2013). Operation Sangaris, launched between 5 and 8 December 2013 led to a de-
ployment of a 1,600 French troops to support the 6,000-strong African-led Inter-
national	Support	Mission	for	the	CAR (MISCA). Despite the many warning signs, 
the risk of genocide proved difficult to avert, as the existing UN presence, the UN 
Integrated	Peacebuilding	Office	 in	 the	Central	African	Republic (BINUCA), was 
understaffed and not equipped to protect civilians and MISCA experienced delays 
in reaching full operational capacity. French operations, however, stayed circum-
scribed to Bangui, and the difficulties immediately encountered by the French troops 
laid bare the scale of the challenge involved in restoring a modicum of order even in 
this limited area (Lockhart Smith, 2014: 177–181). In an evaluation of the situation 
I. Lockhart Smith argued that:
“The adoption of Resolution 2127 meant a rupture with what had hitherto been the 
status quo. But the absence of US15 and European troops (apart from France, despite 
approval of a 500-strong EU joint force in January 2014) meant entry into a peril-
ous stage involving a new status quo: a presence in the CAR, but one that, critically, 
would not necessarily be either sufficient or effective” (Lockhart Smith, 2014: 180).
Enhanced international mediation and intervention became more acute as it be-
came increasingly clear that Djotodia had no control over Séléka. He was pressed to 
resign by regional leaders, and Catherine Samba-Panza, former mayor of Bangui, was 
elected on 20 January 2014 to lead the new interim government until the new elections 
in 2015. Around the same time the EU pledged to reinforce the French presence with 
an addition 500 troops (Louw-Vaudran, 2014). In September, the AU handed over its 
peacekeeping mission to the UN. The former’s 6,000-strong peacekeeping force, along 
with 2,000 French troops had struggled to restore order in CAR. With troops from 
Morocco, Bangladesh and Pakistan, the AU mission MISCA was renamed MINUSCA 
1 Djotodia, born in the remote, impoverished, Muslim north eastern part of the CAR, educated in 
Russia, had worked in Patassé’s government as a civil servant and had been named consul to Nyala 
in Sudan’s Darfur region. From there he was said to have used his time to cultivate alliances with 
Sudanese and Chadian rebels and guns-for-hire, which would become the backbone of his Séléka 
alliance (BBC News, 11.01.2014).
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(United	Nations	Multidimensional	Integrated	Stabilization	Mission	in	the	Central	Afri-
can Republic), subsumed the existing BINUCA, and would increase troops to 12,000, 
securing better financing and air support for peacekeepers (MINUSCA, 2017; Africa	
report, 2014).
By December 2014, at least 5,000 had been killed and hundreds of thousands dis-
placed. Ethnic cleansing had driven the population in religious enclaves in order to 
protect themselves better. As the country is 75% Christian, the Anti-balaka militias 
had the advantage of sheer numbers in the southern regions committing a plethora of 
atrocities on Muslim enclaves. Many factions signed a cease-fire with the transitional 
government in July 2014, but Séléka had fractured internally, some factions rejecting 
the cease-fire. They remain in firm control of the northeast, while Anti-balaka militias 
maintain a grip on large sections of the west. The sudden influx of the displaced to safe 
zones – some 130,000 in Bangui alone in May – led to a humanitarian emergency. The 
peacekeeping force could not stop the sectarian violence in the countryside (Moran, 
2014).
The situation remained unstable for most of 2015. The UN had not sent its most 
professional troops. The French presence had been accused (by Finian Cunningham) 
of being “a fox guarding the hen house” and that their humanitarian deployment was 
meant to mask Paris’ real objective: regime change, that is, the removal Djotodia (The 
Herald, 2014). In addition, there were allegations of child rape and sexual abuse by 
French soldiers in the M’Poko refugee camp, and by other European and UN troops. 
An investigation was launched, but the UN was (initially) criticized for poorly han-
dling the issue. In the end there were no charges for lack of evidence (The Guard-
ian, 29.01.2016; Morenne, 2016). Renewed violence, even in Bangui, paralyzed the 
humanitarian relief effort in late 2015 (McCormick, 2015), further tainting the whole 
operation as a “gross institutional failure” (Deschamps et al., 2015). To make matters 
even worse, the NGO Global Witness issued a report accusing European timber com-
panies (two based in Germany and one in France) of bribing rebel groups to get past 
road blocks and for protection services in order to maintain their logging activities. 
These bribes, estimated at €3.4 million, enabled rebels to continue their operations 
(African Research Bulletin, 11.08.2015).
In 2016, a new president was elected (Faustin-Archange Touadera), supported by 
a new constitution (from December 2015), and the US started support for capacity 
building,2 raising hopes for stability (USIP, 26.09.2016). Nonetheless the situation re-
mains dire, according to an international report: Since 2013, an estimated one-third 
of the population has been displaced. In September 2016, 467,000 Central Africans 
were still registered abroad with the United	Nations	High	Commissioner	for	Refugees 
(UNHCR), and 385,750 were internally displaced persons (IDPs). More than half of 
the refugees have fled to Cameroon, a quarter to the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
and the remainder to Chad and the Republic of Congo. The crisis saw the emergence 
of enclaves, from which trapped populations have been unable to escape for fear of 
their security. These communities rely on the protection of peacekeeping forces and 
2 Before, they had closed their embassy in Bangui due to the violence and had limited their 
engagement to trying to hunt down Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army, operating on CAR ter-
ritory.
	 Armed	Conflicts	in	Africa:	Fragile	States	and	Rising	Instability	 449
remain in confined camps within which they lack access to basic services. The state 
has lost control of large parts of the territory, and armed groups have splintered into 
a multitude of uncontrolled rebel factions, which are increasingly engaging in criminal 
activities (CAR NRPP, 2016: 1, 6). In the midst of a renewed violent outbreak in late 
2016, France declared its peacekeeping mission a success, and stated it would pull 
back its troops, leaving only a residual force of 350 troops in the country to support 
the UN (Gramer, 2016).
SCENARIOS – In the short-term, the state-of-affairs in the CAR remains precarious. 
So far, UN forces have been unable to control or neutralize the violent militias in vari-
ous remote regions of the country, while their hold on security in Bangui is fragile. 
Even if positive steps at reconciliation have been taken by the new elected government 
– initiated by Samba-Panza – the state is non-existent in various parts and its institu-
tions are weak after so many decades of personalist rule. If the government keeps up 
its efforts at inclusion and reconciliation, and a sufficient foreign peacekeeping and 
humanitarian presence remains, the state might be able to avert a reescalation of hos-
tilities. Elite conflict over state resources, spilling over to fractured ethnic communi-
ties has been the main cause of the conflict (Isaacs-Martin 2016). Alas, the complete 
collapse of the rule of law has aggrieved rivalling ethnic groups to such a degree that 
setting up an inclusive government does no longer suffice to bring sustainable peace. 
Especially since numerous non-state actors got involved as well and are increasingly 
abandoning their political aspirations for criminal activities. For instance, the Targeted 
News Service (2014) has identified a conflict within a conflict as widespread cross-
border cattle raiding – cattle being the wealth of the poor – has created a new stage for 
violent competition amongst the impoverished population.
In the mid-term, current peace efforts will be unlikely to succeed if they maintain 
their focus on the Bangui area and neglect the peripheral areas of the CAR. The state’s 
boundaries are porous and foreign predation can reignite communal conflict. The CAR 
is located on a geopolitical fault line and will be affected by events in Chad, South 
Sudan, the DRC, and Northern Uganda. Since progress to counter group grievances, 
uneven development and abject poverty has been slow, it is likely that regional factors 
will overtake these efforts and plunge the CAR’s once again into high-intensity violent 
contestation. The present UN deployment, with its mandate extended to 15 November 
2017 (Resolution 2301 – MINUSCA, 2017) is not sufficient to counter these risks. 
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs have not been effective and 
the ruling CAR leadership has very little interest in implementing these agreements 
(Mwakideu, 2017). The high number of refugees and internally displaced persons, of 
which most are unable to return at this point, will add to the future destabilization of 
CAR’s neighbors, and in turn will trigger external shocks for CAR peacekeeping.
Relentless Civil War in South Sudan
The history of South Sudan is one tragedy after another. After four decades of civil 
war with the government of Khartoum, the south was finally granted independence by 
the international community. Alas, in many respects South Sudan was a stillborn and 
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failed state when it gained sovereignty. War-torn, with a severe capacity gap, former 
warlords failed to build inclusive institutions, while an ‘oil curse’ increased the stakes 
for political control for all factions. A legacy of weak and extractive institutions swiftly 
led to a new legitimacy gap, and just two years and five months after becoming the 
world’s youngest state in 2011, a vicious security gap broke out across ethnic lines in 
December 2013, it’s fast escalation taking the international community by surprise.
This article will not expand on the struggle for South Sudanese independence en-
compassing 20 years of guerilla warfare, claiming the lives of between 1.5 and 2.5 mil-
lion people, and displacing more than 4 million. The root causes of the war included 
disputes over resources, the role of religion in the state, self-determination, the griev-
ances over representation due to the distribution of power and the institutional legacy 
of colonialism (indirect rule) (Zambakari, 2013: 6; BBC, 24.02.2017). In January 2005, 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) formally ending Sudan’s legal authority 
over its southern territories. The CPA transferred power to John Garang de Mabior, 
guerrilla leader of Sudan’s	People’s	Liberation	Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the main 
participant in the Second Sudanese Civil War (Johnson, 2014: 168). His sudden (and 
suspicious) death in a helicopter accident in July 2005, three weeks after his inaugura-
tion as first vice president of the power-sharing Government	of	National	Unity (GNU), 
paved the way for elite power struggles to obtain the leadership.
The main two rivals were Salva Kiir Mayardit, Garang’s deputy, which assumed 
the leadership of the SPLM/A and his two constitutional positions; and Riek Machar, 
occupying the third highest position in the party, which became vice president after 
Garang’s death. Kiir was a veteran guerrilla of the first civil war together with Garang, 
and now the last surviving founder of the SPLM/A. Machar had joined the movement 
from a civilian background, broke with Garang in 1991 over personal and ideological 
differences, failed to create his own movement, and finally could only partly control 
his rivalling Nuer ethnic militias. He reconciled with Garang in 2002, before the peace 
negotiations started (Johnson, 2014: 168).
From his new position, Kiir blocked his rivals within the SPLM by barring them 
from participating in future presidential elections.3 For his cabinet he recruited loyal-
ists from outside the SPLM and when dissatisfied factions started forming around Ma-
char and other prominent SPLM figures, he disbanded their party structures and finally 
even dismissed Machar as prime minister. Machar gain prominence as Kiir’s main 
challenger as he was able to gather these disgruntled, excluded factions and unite them 
in an unstable alliance (Zambakari, 2013; Johnson, 2014; Giffen, 2016). D. Johnson 
states that:
“the coalition was more united in its dissatisfaction with Salva Kiir than in support 
for Riek Machar’s ambitions. Many, in fact, were old opponents of Riek, forced into 
an alliance by Salva Kiir’s increasing authoritarianism and intransigence. They in-
3 This alone let to breakaway movements and mini-rebellions in the oil-rich states of Upper Nile, 
Unity and Jonglei escalating to violent ethnic communal violence. The government responded with 
heavy-handed disarmament campaigns if militias refused to be reintegrated in the national army. As 
Kiir had purged the SPLA, the balance of loyalties in the army was now skewed away from long-
term veterans of the movement and toward defectors with a history of disaffection (Johnson, 2014: 
169–170).
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cluded former governors of Unity, Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, and Lakes states as well 
as a defeated gubernatorial candidate from Central Equatoria; former ministers and 
senior figures in the army; members of John Garang’s family and one-time close as-
sociates of Garang such as Deng Alor Kuol from Abyei. Ethnically they were diverse, 
coming from the three largest Nilotic groups of Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk, as well as 
some Equatorian peoples. Nevertheless, the majority were drawn from Jonglei, Up-
per Nile, and Unity states, the former strongholds of pro Khartoum militias and Riek 
Machar’s 1990s breakaway group. It was an unlikely alliance and proved to be an 
unstable one” (Johnson, 2014: 170).
Opposition forces prepared for rallies, but Kiir took the initiative by attacking Machar 
publically at a National Liberation Council meeting. The opposition denounced the 
allegation and boycotted the meeting. The trigger that escalated the situation in open 
warfare was Kiir’s decision to disarm of the presidential guard, a combination of SPLA 
veterans and recently integrated Nuer troops (Johnson, 2014: 171). Fighting between 
largely Nuer and Dinka soldiers spread to other garrisons around Juba and one day 
later Kiir announced publically that Machar had been behind a coup-attempt,4 sending 
out security forces for his arrest. Machar was able to flee Juba (Giffen, 2016). Muti-
nies of largely Nuer units in Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Unity states followed (Johnson, 
2011: 171).
In response Machar set up the Sudan’s	People’s	Liberation	Movement-in-Oppo-
sition (SPLM-O) in Jonglei and declared war on the government drawing on recruits 
from the Nuer ethnic groups. Fighting has been mostly confined to three of the ten 
states (Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity), but did spread very fast along ethnic lines, es-
pecially ethnic militias committed serious atrocities on the civilian population:
“By January 2015, 1.5 million people had been displaced by violence inside the 
country, another 490,968 had fled the country, and an unprecedented 100,000 were 
seeking refuge from violence inside UN bases. Although casualties are difficult to 
count, the International Crisis Group estimated that 10,000 had been killed in the first 
four months of the conflict” (Giffin, 2016).
When dividing state failure along the three dimensions of a legitimacy, capacity and 
security gap (Call, 2008, 2011), South Sudan at independence would be classified as 
war-torn with a significant capacity gap at the moment of the CPA. Garang’s death trig-
gered a legitimacy gap, in which kleptocratic elite struggles in combination with high 
oil-rents for regime insiders, led to violent mobilization across ethnic lines, re-opening 
the simmering security gap. Between 2005 and 2013, the security gap had been badly 
addressed: defecting militias were bought off with high salaries and promotions for the 
officers in exchange for their reintegration in the national army, expanding the force to 
240,000 (six times the size since the CPA). As Kiir purged the SPLM/A he fired many 
SPLA officers in the army, and by 2013 his SPLA faction was a minority within the na-
tional force, while at the same time salaries did not reach the rank-and-file (corruption 
etc.), leading to mutinies. A. de Waal observes that there were cycles of rent-seeking 
rebellions as army commanders or local political leaders with armed constituents re-
belled against the state and then agreed to be reintegrated back into the government for 
4 These allegations were fabricated, no evidence has ever been found nor officially presented 
(Ylönen, 2014: 468; Johnson, 2014: 171–172).
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higher political and economic rewards; especially before elections or referenda. With 
oil revenues, Kiir was on top of an enormous patronage system, allowing key support-
ers to join the kleptocracy, but he was not in charge of them. And when he could not 
pay them or excluded them, they rebelled to strengthen their negotiating position (de 
Waal, 2014; Giffin, 2014).
During the outbreak of the conflict, Kiir’s SPLA could count on extensive support 
of Uganda’s Museveni, a long-time ally – from his anti-Lord’s Resistance Army Unit 
stationed in the region; and from the SPLA-North in the Blue Nile state and the Darfur 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the former’s ally in South Kordofan.5 Surpris-
ingly, the Khartoum government has backed Juba diplomatically at the outbreak of the 
conflict, offered mediation assistance and was willing to help protect South Sudanese 
oil installations, as the conflict undermines oil production and Sudan is dependent on 
its transit fees. Ethiopia has played an active role to find a negotiated settlement as 
Addis Ababa fears a further escalation. Kenya, concerned about Uganda’s extensive 
involvement, offered moderate support to Kiir’s government as well6 (Ylönen, 2014: 
469–470).
Then UN has been present as well since South Sudan’s inception. As their mandate 
in Sudan ended, their presence was prolonged and their operation rebaptized as the 
United	Nations	Mission	in	South	Sudan	(UNMISS) with UN Resolution 1996 in 2011. 
They assisted in implementing the CPA, and aimed to strengthen the capacity of the 
Government of South Sudan to govern effectively and democratically and establish 
good relations with its neighbors. To cope with the rapid spread of the violence and the 
unexpected influx of refugees and IDPs the UNSC temporarily increased the overall 
troop and police strength of the Mission: The interim troop level of UNMISS was 
raised to 12,500 personnel and the police component to 1,323 personnel, including ap-
propriate formed police units, through temporary transfers from existing peacekeeping 
operations through inter-mission cooperation, with matching funds (UN Resolution 
2132 in 2013). As the civil war broke out, the UNSC unanimously adopted UN Reso-
lution 2155 in 2014 to reprioritize UNMISS’s mandate towards the protection of civil-
ians, human rights monitoring and support for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, 
and increased the Mission’s troop strength to 12,500 and a police component to up to 
1,323 personnel. In addition, it created the Intergovernmental	Authority	on	Develop-
ment (IGAD) task force to support protection of civilians and monitor the cease fire 
agreement (UNMISS, 2017). Kiir has been adamant in refusing AU troops, potentially 
including Sudanese soldiers – to bolster the UN mission (IRIN, 27.07.2016).
In December 2016, the conflict has been roaming for three years. Multiple cease-
fire and peace agreements (the last one in 2015) have been routinely breached by all 
warring sides, flouting disarmament and dragging their feet on constitutional reforms 
(Patinkin, McCormick, 2016), while their undisciplined militias continue to terrorize 
the population:
5 The SPLA-North and JEM are former SPLA militias that decided to remain in Sudan after 
independence. They have been officially disbanded after clashes with president al-Bashir, but still 
operate (Mahr, 2011).
6 Both Kenya and Ethiopia have tried to mediate the conflict within the Intergovernmental	Au-
thority	on	Development	(IGAD).
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“Apart from mass killings, 1.87 million civilians have been displaced internally to 
overloaded camps, placing excessive burdens on shelter, health care, sanitation, wa-
ter, and food services. 1.1 million civilians have sought shelters as refugees in neigh-
boring countries, mainly Uganda. Food insecurity has reached an unprecedented 
high; 4.8 million South Sudanese, roughly more than a third of the population, are 
facing severe food shortages. [...] The absence of clean water and proper sanitation 
has led to re-emergence of cholera outbreaks. [...] Children, in particular, are severely 
affected by the conflict; it has been estimated that 3.2 million children under the age 
of 18 years are affected. 16,000 children have been recruited by military forces, and 
they are increasingly susceptible to detention, exploitation, physical violence, psy-
chological trauma, and sexual assault. 13,000 children are missing, separated from 
their families, or unaccompanied” (Abu-Zaid, 2017).
Last July (2016) Riek Machar’s troops managed to fight their way to the forests near 
Juba resulting in heavy casualties. However the SLPA succeeded in chasing his mili-
tias from the capital southwest through Yei and into the neighboring DRC. Citizens of 
Yei, which is ethnically diverse, but had remained peaceful so far – were subjugated to 
ethnic cleansing, indiscriminate killings, gang rape as SLPA troops hunted down Ma-
char. So far, violence continues in the area (Miles, 2017; Sudan Tribune, 30.07.2016). 
The conflict remains complicated due the amount of foreign predation and spoilers. 
The PRC for instance, protecting its oil interests, suddenly had to deal with two Sudans 
in 2011, with most of the oil deposits in the south. The PRC has mostly been unwilling 
to intervene in Sudanese affairs, but as civil war broke out in 2013 this has led to a situ-
ation where the PRC has been providing arms to both Sudans, since it was unwilling or 
unable to rein in its own (Chinese) arms dealers, such as Norinco. Since Khartoum has 
been supporting Machar’s rebels (as it did before with the Yau Yau rebellion), Chinese 
arms have been provided to opposing sides (either directly by the PRC or indirectly 
through Khartoum) (IRIN, 27.07.2016). This also shows that Sudan is playing every 
card in its hand to ensure it has influence in South Sudan, as it still has major stakes in 
the boundary delimitation and disputed oil fields (Ferrie, 2016; O’Grady, 2015).
SCENARIOS – There are few indicators that violence will abate. The causes of the 
conflict are the legitimacy gap caused by Kiir (Biar Ajak, 2015), resulting in a new se-
curity gap as Machar set up the SPLA-O to overthrow him. The country’s capacity and 
security gaps had not been sufficiently addressed by the kleptocratic oil-regime in Juba 
after independence (de Simone, 2013; Munive, 2014). New institutions were weak and 
meant to extend patronage along ethnic lines, not to be redistribute or inclusive, result-
ing in inter-ethnic animosities and struggles for state resources (Zambakari, 2013). 
Without such institutions, ethnic groups like the Dinka and Nuer, but also the Aguok, 
Apuk and Kuac will continue to negotiate balances of power through violent conflict at 
regional and local levels. If one group became advantaged, others would take up arms 
to restore the power balance (Pendle, 2014).
In the short-term, President Kiir – even when increasingly criticized by the interna-
tional community – has no attractive exit-option for the SPLM/A. In absence thereof, 
he will continue to fight challengers as long as he has the military clout to do so. At 
the moment, Museveni’s support is crucial and has emboldened him to refuse AU in-
tervention and defy demands for an inclusive peace process and political reforms that 
might result in him losing power (Ylönen, 2014: 471). An impatient US wanted to im-
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pose more sanctions, but an adamant Russia and PRC have blocked this in the UNSC. 
The PRC is still Juba’s greatest diplomatic and economic ally and wants to stabilize the 
conflict while not antagonizing Kiir’s regime or its Sudanese partners. This balancing 
exercise has been most difficult for Beijing and – contrary to its bilateral habits – the 
PRC even engaged in multilateral frameworks and (uniquely) sent troops to the UN 
peacekeeping Mission (Vasselier, 2016). Nonetheless, Chinese support for Kiir diverts 
international pressure on his regime and their attempts to strike a balance between their 
allies’ interests makes progress too slow.
The mid-term perspective is equally grim. Even if Machar would be defeated mili-
tarily, the ruling regime of Kiir does not have the legitimacy to continue its rule over 
South Sudan. Rival spoilers (like Kampala and Khartoum) and the abundance or arms 
will continue to brew a violent mix as grievances among ethnic groups are peaking due 
to the humanitarian horror and famine. The only way to divert South Sudan from more 
future civil war is to create an inclusive transition government, cease using oil-rents 
to bribe rebel groups back into the fold, but on the contrary deter them from taking 
up arms, and use the oil-wealth to start addressing the capacity gap. This is highly un-
likely as Juba’s even has enemies beyond its disputed borders and keeps up its current 
military budget in order to extend patronage and ensure regime survival. Anyway, oil-
wealth has never been conductive to mend exclusive state institutions, but enhances 
uneven development and authoritarianism instead (Guliyev, 2014).
The Niger Delta Cyclical Conflicts
West Africa in 2016 has also seen a resurgence on the Niger Delta Conflict in 2016 
after President Muhammadu Buhari won the 2015 elections. His predecessor, Good-
luck Jonathan, originating from the Delta himself, had managed to broker a peace deal 
with militants, which now has collapsed again (BBC, 28.10.2016). The conflict has 
a long legacy, tracking back to the Biafran secession and the brutal repression of the 
Ogoni protests under Sani Abacha in the mid-1990s. Uneven development, pollution 
by spilling and flaring, and the ‘oil curse’ have made the Niger Delta the epicenter of 
domestic conflict. It stretches across five littoral states and six internal landlocked ones 
encompassing about 20 million impoverished villagers and shantytown folk (Clarke, 
2010: 89; Oduah, 2016). They have struggled for autonomy, equal distribution of oil 
revenues, environmental and social justice from the federal government and against 
land grabbing since the 1950s. The Niger Delta produces about 90% of Nigeria’s crude 
and accounts for roughly 70% of government revenue (totaling around $80–90 bil-
lion in 2012 and 2013). People are aggrieved that such revenue is not reinvested in 
their region. They consider oil money as their birthright and feel they have a right to 
its wealth. Instead they suffer the costs of severe environmental degradation (Oduah, 
2016). Historically, numerous groups have taken up the cause of the Niger Delta in one 
form or another, with various programs of contention ranging from peaceful petitions 
to pipeline sabotage and assassinations. However since 2006 violence have flared up 
again. As of 2016 there were five militant groups, the most prominent one being the 
Movement	for	the	Emancipation	of	the	Niger	Delta (MEND). One of the new groups 
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is the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), which are responsible for various acts of sabotage 
since March 2016 (Muvunyi, 2016).
The Nigerian federal government was running a Presidential	Amnesty	Program 
(PAP) since 2009. It is being continued today, but Buhari’s background (a Muslim 
from the north) and his decision to slash funding for the program (by about 70%), 
revoking some security contracts, and scrapping the plan to build a new university, 
has made Delta inhabitants suspicious of his commitment. They feel that they are be-
ing punished for supporting his electoral challenger (and incumbent) G. Jonathan in 
the last elections (Oduah, 2016). The NDA was one of the first to open hostilities and 
through pipeline sabotage demanded concessions from the state. A ceasefire agreement 
was signed in August 2016, but soon after, new militias, like the Niger Delta Green-
land Justice Mandate formed and started operating independently (Uldom, 2016). The 
PAP shows that granting amnesties to violent militias can be effective, but if it is the 
main or only method of coping with violent insurrections, rent-seeking groups will 
corrupt the co-optation mechanism and create new groups to commit acts of sabotage 
just in order to be paid off. The MEND has fallen into this pattern in 2009 (Dickinson, 
2009), the NDA did in 2016, and new groups will follow.
SCENARIOS – As there have been serious disruptions in Nigeria’s oil production, 
the government has agreed to invest $10 billion to build infrastructure, including roads 
and railways, and to tackle widespread poverty in the region (BBC, 2.10.2016). How-
ever, without any commitment to political settlement on the rebels’ demand that the 
Niger Delta receive a greater percentage of the country’s oil revenues. Nor has there 
been any effort to stem the local corruption that enriches local officials at the expense 
of pretty much everyone else and diverts huge development funds from reaching the 
Delta. Without such improvement, the only short-term scenario will be more or the 
same – that is – cyclical local rebellions and attacks on infrastructure, keeping the state 
revenues from production hostage in exchange for immediate pay-offs (see also: Dick-
inson, 2009). If the militant groups are payed off, new ones will appear in the blink of 
an eye, as the structural causes of the militancy are not removed, and, on the contrary, 
the PAP provides incentives to resort to violence.
A mid-term scenario is hard to predict as Nigeria suffers from the ‘oil curse’ 
(Guliyev, 2014) and is unlikely to democratize and become more inclusive and less 
corrupt. These exclusive political and economic structures are maintained by the oil 
revenues, making subsequent regimes unaccountable. This state-of-affairs, in turn, 
recreates these same structures. The Boko Haram insurrection can likewise be traced 
back to the same structural causes of horizontal group grievances7 and uneven devel-
opment. In absence of any other factors, the mid-term scenario, alas, might be slow 
progress in providing infrastructure and government services to the region as the 
federal government understands that withholding these will result in an even more 
fertile breeding ground for armed militant groups. Nonetheless, progress is likely to 
be slow and in absence of a political agreement to redistribute rents, violence will 
not disappear altogether.
7 Socioeconomic ‘horizontal inequalities’ (or inequalities among identity groups) contribute to 
violent political mobilization (Stewart, 2012: 93–103).
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Festering Border Disputes
Due to the colonial legacy, Africa has known a whole array of border disputes. As – es-
pecially offshore – oil extraction progresses some of these have become salient again, 
and have flared up in recent years. Examples of those oil-related maritime disputes 
are currently undergoing between the Ivory Coast – Ghana, Kenya – Somalia, Congo 
(Brazzaville) – Angola, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, and Malawi and Tanzania (over 
oil deposits in lake Malawi/Nyasa). Most of them are brought to the AU or Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ) or are peacefully resolved bilaterally, since warfare would 
disrupt production, in which all involved parties lose (Africanews, 2016; Malek, 2016; 
Okello, 2016; Oilreviewafrica, 2016; Salau, 2016). This is a break with the past, where 
some of these disputes did escalate into violence, like for instance the Sand War be-
tween Algeria and Morocco in 1963, or the Petrol	War between Guinea-Bissau and 
Senegal, or the conflict over the Bakassi Peninsula between Nigeria and Cameroon 
(1990s). In those cases, extraction had not yet or barely begun, and therefore could not 
be disrupted.
Uncertain land borders and staunch sovereignty do not go well together. Even the 
changing of the Akanyaru riverbed over time since 1965 (due to siltation and flood-
ing caused by heavy rainfalls), altering the border between Rwanda and Burundi, can 
create cause for conflict if there is no political will to play ball (The East African, 
9.01.2017). In general, land border disputes (excluding resource wars) have escalated 
to open warfare only in one region: the Horn of Africa, even when there were twice 
as many in Western Africa. M. Kornprobst (2002: 367) has explained this by looking 
at the status of Ethiopia, which is considered a ‘colonial power’ in the eyes of Eritrea 
and Somalia, leading to a variation in their adherence to the ‘territorial integrity norm,’ 
which other Sub Saharan states do share (since none considers the other a colonizer), 
preventing violent escalation.
The Eritrean-Ethiopian border war, a remnant of Eritrea’s 30-years war for lib-
eration, followed by their high-intensity interstate war from 1998 to 2000 (killing 
100,000), did flare up violently on 12 June 2016, resulting in hundreds of casual-
ties. Cynical analyses that both parties initiated the conflict to mask internal human 
rights violations aside, the conflict probably escalated due some provocation on 
the ground as the border is heavily guarded on both sides (Wrong, 2016; Gaffey, 
2016).
The Sudan-South Sudan share a border of 2,010 km and still have no agreement 
over its final delimitation. Both countries have repeatedly committed themselves to the 
establishment of a Safe	Demilitarized	Border	Zone (SDBZ), but the border remains 
militarized and trade is disrupted. Especially northern pastoralists who seasonally mi-
grate into South Sudan continue to be harassed on both sides of the border. Since South 
Sudan’s independence in 2011, the border has been marked with clashes since both 
the SPLM/A and the al-Bashirs’s National	Congress	Party (NCP) have attempted to 
gain territorial advantages on the battlefield that can later be translated into gains at the 
negotiating table.
When it comes to South Kordofan and the Blue Nile regions, they had been on the 
frontline of the Sudan Civil Wars, and now continue to fight for autonomy and politi-
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cal reform. Both regions are split between communities wanting to join Khartoum and 
Juba respectively. Especially, but not exclusively the large Nuba population in both re-
gions identify with the latter (Insight on Conflict, 2009). In essence the conflict in both 
regions is a continuation of the Sudanese Second Civil War (1983–2005) as both areas 
were given the (vague) right to popular consultation during the CPA, and both have 
suffered social, political, and economic marginalization even since. Fighting broke out 
when the Khartoum demanded that all SPLA forces in the two areas fully disarm by 
1 June 2011, before the CPA implementation deadline (De Alessi, 2015). Khartoum 
has responded by aerial bombings and ground offensives, which have not ceased since 
2017.
After a 2009 referendum, the oil-rich area of Abyei awaits a referendum to decide 
its fate, but its biggest oil fields have been granted to Khartoum. One of the local com-
munities, the Ngok Dinka, have launched their own referendum in October 2013, vot-
ing to join South Sudan, but the result has not been internationally recognized. Disa-
greements over who is eligible to vote continue, and boycotts from other communities 
make the results invalid (Insight on Conflict, 2009; HSBA, 2015).
SCENARIOS – In the short or mid-term it is unlikely that the situation will im-
prove between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and future escalations are possible and likely, 
since the conflict has been entrenched for decades, and both regimes would lose face 
domestically if they would abide by earlier rulings from the border commission in 
The Hague. None of the two authoritarian states can stand to lose more legitimacy 
in this regards and in addition, the Asmara regime does stand to gain by keeping 
the conflict ‘lukewarm,’ since it is their foremost excuse to keep up their obligatory 
military service, effectively their main repressive control element to keep to Eri-
trean population in check, resulting in systematic enslavement of their population. 
Without regime change at least in Eritrea, one cannot expect an improvement of this 
situation in the near future.
A similar conclusion can be drawn for Sudan-South Sudan’s border disputes. 
As the border zone contains oil deposits and agricultural land, and the groups liv-
ing on the territory switch alliances regularly, there is no hope for an easy solution. 
The lack of progress in negotiations, the effective failure of the CPA, despite dip-
lomatic statements to the contrary, is eminently productive for Khartoum, which 
in the meantime can collect the totality of oil revenues from deposits in Abyei, 
while influencing South Sudanese politics through South Kordofan and the Blue 
Nile region. So the current, uncertain state-of-affairs are far better than any of 
the diplomatic proposals currently on the table (HSBA, 2015). Any agreement 
on a common border will require both states to make substantial compromises. It 
seems likely that, if the 1956 border is adhered to, Sudan will lose Kafia Kingi and 
South Sudan will lose the 14-Mile Area. Such losses risk upsetting communities 
that constitute powerful political constituencies for the NCP and SPLM/A, respec-
tively an it turn for al-Bashir’s and Kiir’s personalist power coalitions. If these 
break down, so might their regimes. In this context, both sides have every reason 
not to agree on a final border, which allows them to placate groups whose support 
they can ill afford to lose at a time when both regimes face various internal crises 
(Craze, 2014: 15–16).
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Pockets of Regional Insurrection
Sub-Saharan Africa is also the arena of various regional rebellions, great and small, 
new and old, which flare up at various intervals. A full exposition on their origins and 
dynamics is beyond the scope of this article, but in all cases it is important to highlight 
that since their structural causes (uneven development, discrimination and govern-
ment-sponsored retaliation (either directly or by proxy through local (ethnic) militias), 
and inter-group grievances) have not been addressed, nor can one expect a peaceful 
resolutions of these conflicts in the near future.
DARFUR – notwithstanding its disappearance from the global headlines since the 
government’s genocide, the Darfur region in Sudan is still not at peace (Insight on 
Conflict, 2009). In 2014 it experienced the highest levels of violence since 2004, 
nearly half a million people were displaced. Al-Bashir has become desperate to end 
at least one of the three rebellions in his country, so – as before – his troops have 
been working in concert with Arab militias to attack the rebels, imposing arbitrary 
violence and ethnic cleaning on the population (The Guardian, 2.05.2017). The lat-
est assault started in May 2016 (Reeves, 2016): A large-scale military offense in 
Jebel Marra was followed with chemical gas attack in September, killing hundreds 
(Rothwell, 2016). With Russia and the PRC blocking sanctions against Khartoum, 
it is unlikely the international community will be able to put much pressure on the 
regime. In addition, in order to stem the influx of refugees, the EU has reached out to 
al-Bashir to monitor Sudan’s borders in exchange for EU funds. Such conflict policy 
agenda toward Khartoum makes a strong condemnation of the Darfur crisis even 
more unlikely (Malik, 2016).
CONGO (Brazzaville) – in the Republic of Congo, the so-called Ninja-rebels have 
resumed activities after their opposition candidate (Guy-Brice Parfait Kolélas) lost to 
the incumbent, dictator Denis Sassou Nguesso in the March 2016 elections. Histori-
cally, the militia had rebelled in support of Kolelas’ father (Bernard), which fought 
against Nguesso’s Cobra militias during the 1990s struggle for power and subsequent 
coup d’état. B. Kolélas fled the country afterwards and died in exile in France in 2009. 
During his exile, the Ninjas were commanded by the messianic, Frédéric Bintsangou, 
known as ‘Pastor Ntoumi.’ However the conflict relocated to the Pool province in 
southern Congo (Kolélas’ birth region) after Nguesso took power. It is obvious that 
the political deal with the government in June 2008 has broken down now and that 
the early progress of National	Program	of	Demobilization,	Disarmament	and	Reinte-
gration (NPDDR) is being reversed. After sporadic incidents in the 2000s, escalating 
violence has displaced some 13,000 people in the Pool province, disrupted their health 
care and education services. In addition, violence has already made residents miss 
one harvest and makes them unable to plant their crops before the rainy season, rais-
ing fears of famine among the IDPs (The Japan Times, 3.10.2016; Buchanan, 2016; 
UNHCR, 2016).
DRC – in the DRC likewise elections – or at least their unlawful postponement – have 
made old conflict resurface. J. Kabila’s stubborn determination to hold onto power be-
yond his legal mandate, have triggered protests in Kinshasa and many other towns. As 
insecurity and anti-regime contention spread over the war-torn DRC with its deepen-
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ing legitimacy gap, M23 rebels8 from refugee camps in Uganda flooded back to eastern 
Congo (The East African, 21.01.2017). And a new rebel group (the Kamuina Nsapu 
militia) has emerged in the Kasai region at the moment of writing (BBC, 24.04.2017; 
Clowes, 2017). 57 years of civil war, warlordism and personalist rule will continue to 
spawn rebellions if the DRC’s legitimacy and capacity are not addressed. The continu-
ation of the former precludes the improvement of the latter, and the situation is most 
precarious due to continues foreign predation on Congo’s resources in the east.
ANGOLA – in Cabinda, the Front	 for	 the	 Liberation	 of	 the	 Enclave	 of	 Cabinda 
(FLEC) has also renewed its activities in August 2016, bringing the total death toll to 
40 casualties from clashes between the FLEC and Angolan government forces. FLEC 
demands Cabinda’s independence since it accounts for half of Angola’s oil output. 
They have reasserted their demands since the death this year of its 88-year-old founder, 
Nzita Tiago, in exile in France. The rebels, however, do not have the ability to affect 
oil output in Angola, since nearly all extraction happens offshore. For obvious reasons, 
Luanda will never part with its exclave. So low-intensity conflict is expected to flare 
up from time to time in the future (Reuters, 1.08.2016, 8.08.2016).
SENEGAL – the conflict in Casamance (south Senegal, separated by the Gambia), 
has faded down after Movement	of	Democratic	Forces	of	Casamance (MFDC) de-
clared a ceasefire in 2014 (BBC, 30.04.2014). The recent removal of Gambian dictator 
Yahya Jammeh by ECOWAS forces, might contribute to stability in this region. Since 
Senegal’s relations with Guinea-Bissau also have improved, most foreign support for 
the MFDC has dried up, and the rebel groups’ cannabis trafficking is more a criminal 
enterprise than the movement’s bread basket. (Although they still facilitate and tax the 
contraband flows, the revenues are too small for sustained armed rebellion in the mid-
1990s.) By the 2000s, financial and material commitments from Dakar to incentivize 
peace have had the opposite effect, preventing incentives to sustain the conflict for the 
benefits of government financing. Enhanced cooperation between Senegal, Barrow’s 
new democratically elect government in the Gambia, and Guinea-Bissau are likely to 
keep violence down. There exist fears that the cocaine trafficking – of which Bissau is 
the continental hub – might reach Casamance due to its porous borders, but so far this 
is not the case (Zartman, 2016).
PART II: THE TERRORISM THREAT IN AFRICA IN 2016. 
MAJOR DETERMINANTS & PERSPECTIVES
Permanently Unstable North, South, and East Africa
The situation in North Africa in 2016 was permanently unstable mainly because of 
a correlation of three major factors, directly connected to some actions that the state 
and non-state actors had taken. The first factor was linked to the high risk of activity of 
various terrorist organizations, like Da’ish (the so-called Islamic State) or those which 
8 Named after the March 23 2009 peace agreement, also known as the National	Congress	for	the	
Defense	of	the	People	before splintering into various fractions.
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still have some relationship with classical Al Qaeda. The second factor was strongly 
related to the internal destabilization of states like Libya or Egypt due to their compli-
cated political situation, which had a source in the trends that had been started in the 
period of the so-called Arab Spring. The third of the aforementioned factors was the 
potential threat of rivalry between some of the major states of the region, mostly Alge-
ria and Morocco, which might have had an impact on the onset of the regional conflict. 
This analysis will focus on such matters and, simultaneously, attempt to present pos-
sible scenarios of development in the selected states.
Al Shabaab in Somalia
Since the 1990s, the Horn of Africa is one of the most turbulent regions of the world 
where the major security challenges intersect: from a permanent destabilization of the 
central government in Somalia and the existence of local separatist movements in the 
regions of Puntland or Ogaden and almost fully independent Somaliland, to piracy in 
the Gulf of Aden, a famine threat among people who lived in this region and, of course, 
terrorism. All of these happened mainly due to the internal situation in Somalia, which 
ranked first in the 2016 Fragile State Index (Found for Peace, 2017) and became a gen-
eral source of destabilization for other states, such as Kenya, Ethiopia or Eritrea. For 
a fuller picture of this region, it should be mentioned that Somalia has been listed in 
the top ten of the most fragile states in the world since 2006. Nevertheless, it is also 
important to pay more attention to the operations of one of the most effective and 
strongly present Islamic Jihadi terrorist organizations called Al-Shabaab. The name 
of this structure stands for “The Youth” and it was coined around 2006, directly as 
a result of the Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia (BBC, 9.12.2016). The aim 
of this intervention was to overthrow the radical Islamic Courts Union’s (ICU) power 
in Somalia and to retake control by some Somali antiterrorist fractions supported both 
by the United States and the most influential regional actors, carried out with the afore-
mentioned Ethiopia. This successfully military operation ran by external forces ended 
in 2009 and was replaced by the UN peacekeeping operation AMISOM, which was 
officially launched in 2007 and has been operated in Somalia ever since.
However, the strategic victory over the conventional powers and forces of the ICU 
has left an enormous void of space for other forms of resistance by Somali Islamic 
radicals to fill. Because of that, a major youth fraction from the former ICU decided to 
start an independent long-term partisan warfare; as a result, a wave of terrorist attacks 
against the targets, located not only in Somalia, followed. Al Shabaab concentrates 
their actions within Somalia where the governmental forces in Mogadishu and the 
AMISOM units have never gained full control over the situation. Almost since the 
beginning, Al Shabaab has been the symbol of terrorism in East Africa, carrying out 
a lot of minor and major terrorist attacks in 2006–2016 (Sky News, 2.04.2015). One 
of the most publicized was the one in the Kenyan capital city of Nairobi in 2013 when 
an Al Shabaab terrorist group stormed the West Gate shopping mall and killed or seri-
ously injured several hundred innocent people. It is necessary to underline that this 
situation in Kenya has sparked a worldwide discussion about the security in shopping 
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malls in the face of a danger of ‘active shooter’ scenarios. Structurally, Al Shabaab is 
still a part of the global Al Qaeda’s network. In 2008, the then leader of Al-Shabaab, 
Ahmed Abdi Godane, vel “Mukhtar Abu Zubair,” pledged allegiance to Osama bin 
Laden. Moreover, in 2012 Ayman al-Zawahiri declared that Al Shabaab had formally 
joined Al Qaeda; this was stated after a video release in which Abdi Godane pledged 
full allegiance to the successor of bin Laden (Horadam, Cleaves, Sorhaindo, 2015). 
After the creation of the so-called Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, they rejected joining 
this new organization and even initiated some brutal actions aimed against the Somali 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi supporters.
At the beginning of 2016, Al Shabaab was mostly focused on a kind of a two-
pronged strategy. The first goal was to secure their stable position of an official ruler 
in some of the controlled regions in the South and North of Somalia. Even though they 
were pushed out of the cities, the stabilization of the sanctuary in rural regions gave 
them an opportunity to plan some further attacks against AMISOM and the govern-
mental forces. At the same time, they intensified a campaign of typical terrorist attacks, 
mostly in some urban areas. Of course, the potential destabilization of the situation in 
Mogadishu was their main aim, as a symbol of the ineptitude of the new government, 
supported by African states and the West. For this purpose, in January they attacked 
e.g. a very popular Beach View café, located at the Lido beach, using a combination of 
bombs and shooters to kill and injure as many as they can. It is necessary to highlight 
that this attack against a café was also a symbol of a new enlargement of a list of poten-
tial targets for Al Shabaab in Somalia. Previously, the terrorists mostly tried to threaten 
hotels or some strategic public buildings (Mutiga, 22.01.2016).
After that, in 2016 multiple other attacks followed, aimed at a broad spectrum of 
targets located mostly in the capital city of Mogadishu. An evaluation of the organiza-
tion’s capabilities at that time shows that an assault against the SYL hotel in Febru-
ary was definitely symbolic. Although the security forces managed to stop a suicide 
bomber and gunmen at a checkpoint before they could reach the above-mentioned ho-
tel, Al Shabaab signaled that they possessed the ability to organize more attacks even 
in a close proximity to the most secure presidential palace. Terrorists repeated such 
a tactic in June 2016 when another hotel, Nasa-Hablod, became a target of a coordi-
nated strike by a vehicle-borne, improvised explosive device – VBIED, and a group of 
shooters (The Guardian, 25.06.2016). Like in the West Gate case, all terrorist attacks 
against hotels in 2016 in Somalia prompted an important discussion about the level of 
security in the most well-known tourist locations in East Africa, Kenya in particular, 
where Al Shabaab has some influence not only in the border region but also in some 
major cities. Of course, Kenyan intelligence and security forces carried out numerous 
operations against recruitment and logistic cells of this terrorist organization on their 
own soil in 2016, to prevent this threat.
From the global perspective on the terrorist threat, another significant case was the 
attack onboard the Daallo Airlines Flight no. 159 in February 2016. An Airbus A321-111 
on route to Jeddah in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia took off from the Mogadishu Inter-
national Airport in Somalia. The flight was never completed because of an explosion 
onboard. The aftermath investigation of this incident brought an alarming hypothesis 
that the explosive device was built into a laptop computer. Probably, the bomb was 
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so sophisticated that the terrorist could carry this item past the X-ray machines at the 
Mogadishu airport. This might be a clear evidence of a far-reaching cooperation be-
tween Al Qaeda of the Arabic Peninsula (AQAP) and the Somali Al Shabaab, regard-
ing explosive devices construction (Kriel, Cruickshank, 12.02.2016). This proves Al 
Shabaab is an organization which focuses not only on internal and regional issues.
However, an even greater risk of destabilization in Somalia in 2016 came not from 
a terrorist tactic but rather conventional attacks and raids of the Al Shabaab paramilitary 
units outside of Mogadishu. AMISOM and the newly trained Somali National Army 
– SNA – pushed Al Shabaab away from its major strongholds owing to better equipment, 
air support etc. But, since 2016, it has become apparent that the strategic initiative has 
weakened and the military operations have lost their impetus. This happened not only 
because of the weakness of the Somali government and its armed forces but also due to 
the differences between AMISOM forces and Ethiopia’s or Kenya’s military and politi-
cal leaders (Meservey, 2016). It is worth noting that in 2016 the problem of financing 
the presence of multinational forces in Somalia became more visible. For instance, at 
a meeting of the UN Security Council on 19 May, 2016, President Uhuru Kenyatta said 
that AMISOM was not receiving the resources and equipment it needed to carry out its 
mandate. He said it was not his government’s responsibility to fill the funding gap (Mu-
vunyi, 30.05.2016). Each weakness was militarily and politically used by Al Shabaab to 
expand the controlled area. This was evident at the beginning of 2016 when the control 
over a large territory and groups of cities like Dayniile, Tooratorow, Yaq Bari Weyne, 
Buufow, Ababay, Qoryooley, Awdheegle or Golweyne has been taken.
Since 2016, Al Shabaab’s local commanders have felt confident enough to begin 
a series of military operations aimed at the military bases of AMISOM, Kenyan or So-
mali armed forces. In January, they assaulted the El-Adde compound, manned by the 
elite, by Somali standards, of the infantry units from Kenyan Defense Forces – KDF. 
Terrorists used VBIED and small units to force their way into the military zone and 
to inflict losses on a group of defenders (Raubo, 19.01.2016). In the following month, 
they also took control over a very important city of Merca because of its strategic loca-
tion and a close proximity to the capital. Of course, like in every such a situation, Al 
Shabaab was not able to keep all the territorial gains for long; each offensive or even 
a single battle showed increased capabilities of this terrorist organization.
SCENARIOS – As some of the most important last year’s events indicate, in 2017 
Al Shabaab have regained their operational sources; this has happened because of a 
limited military pressure from AMISOM in 2015–2016, in conjunction with financial 
problems, some misunderstandings between political leaders from African states who 
are the members of the peacekeeping mission and, of course, because of the internal 
problems of Somali governments. However, a new potential trend in fighting a cam-
paign against Al Shabaab, started earlier by the USA, can be seen. The external forces 
will focus their attention only on strikes on selected targets from terrorist organiza-
tions, without any long-term, holistic strategy to rebuild Somalia. Such a situation 
occurred before, after El-Adde battle in which (most likely) Kenyan air forces had 
attacked some of the Al Shabaab’s camps. It is necessary to underline that the Ameri-
can Special Operation Forces – various SOF units, are present in Somali territory and 
perhaps even use the base in Mogadishu for a full spectrum of missions. This might be 
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a modus operandi for Kenya or Ethiopia. However, it will be carried out at the expense 
of further weakening of some AMISOM operations. Perhaps there will also be much 
more air attacks on the targets connected to Al-Shabaab, both with conventional planes 
and unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs.
An open question is how Al Shabaab leaders could use the present problems of 
drought and famine in Somalia for their own strategic purposes in 2017. For instance, 
any imbalance within the external humanitarian aid might be some kind of a turning 
point for them. Local tribes could withdraw their support for the central government 
and this will create perfect circumstances for first – infiltration, and second – expan-
sion of Al Shabaab, straight from the terrorists’ sanctuaries to new lands which they 
lost after 2011. However, this is only one of many challenges faced by the central 
government in Mogadishu. Therefore, it is impossible for the government to use all its 
forces against them. Other problems include, for example, the threat of a new wave of 
piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the problematic relations between Somalia and Somaliland 
but also some other regions, etc.
For Al-Shabaab, 2017 will be a period of implementing and testing their new strat-
egy in fights against their internal and external enemies. On one hand, they will do 
this based on stronger guerrilla warfare and their attempts to control and govern more 
territories. On the other hand, they will try to launch stronger terrorist campaigns in 
major cities like Mogadishu, using the methods they had already tried out not only in 
their past actions but also in Yemen or Syria. There is a need for the present emir of Al-
Shabaab, Ahmed Umar aka Abu Ubaidah (Counter Extremism Project 1), to halt the 
creation of some kind of an internal opposition, based on the cooperation with Da’ish. 
Similarly to Afghanistan or Syria, the terrorists of Al Qaeda and Da’ish fight each 
other for power, money, and new recruits. Somalia is no exception; some struggles are 
even crueler in comparison to other regions.
Egypt’s Internal Instability
Similarly to Somalia, most of the North African states have struggled not only with 
a terrorist threat but also with some others security challenges. Of course, the so-called 
Arab Spring and a series of rapid popular revolutions or armed uprisings after 2010–
2011 were a turning point which has propelled a change in the structural vision of the 
regional order and, like in Libya, put this state on the brink of collapse and full internal 
division. Hence, in 2016 we witnessed certain continuity of same dangerous trends 
which might have a further impact not only on them but also on Europe. Generally, this 
issue is related to such problems as counterterrorism and the fight against Al Qaeda 
and Da’ish, border security, especially of the Libya-Egypt border, the potential level 
of rivalry between the regional state players, and the maritime security in strong mi-
gration crisis. There is also a question about how to deal with some new authoritarian 
governments formed after 2013, e.g. in Egypt, and whether the West will accept any 
forms of new potential authoritarian regimes in North Africa.
At the beginning, considering the strategic location of Egypt, all plans of a long-
term stabilization of the North Africa’s region need to be based on a strong cooperation 
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with the rulers from Cairo. Unfortunately, this country’s internal situation is far from 
a satisfactory security level. First of all, Egyptian armed forces, border guards and 
other security structures in 2016 were still involved in open warfare with terrorism on 
the Sinai Peninsula. It is important to mention that Sinai has never been a secure place 
and that this territory was an arena of a series of armed conflicts and disputes between 
Egypt and Israel. In the words of Z. Laub:
“Though the peninsula is a land bridge connecting Africa and Asia, historically it has 
separated as much as joined them. The region’s majority Bedouin population shares 
closer historical and cultural ties to the Levant and Arabian Peninsula than the Egyp-
tian mainland” (Laub, 2013).
The most important jihadi player in this Egyptian region is, of course, Da’ish, also 
known as Wilayat or in English, the Sinai Province which, officially, constitutes a part 
of a self-styled caliphate, with the headquarters in Syria and Iraq. This structure uses 
a global brand of Bakr al-Baghdadi organization, adding some local aspects and en-
joying the operational freedom. Formally new Wilayat was “established in late 2014 
when the Sinai-based Salafist-jihadi group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) pledged 
its allegiance to the ‘caliphate.’ Previously, ABM had declared war on the Egyptian 
government following the 2013 overthrow of Egyptian President Mohammad Morsi” 
(AIPAC, 2016). A big publicity has been achieved by them after a November 2015 
terrorist attack, against the civilian Russian airplane, carrying tourists from Sharm el-
Sheikh. Because of it, some previously concealed by the government in Cairo security 
problems from Sinai suddenly became an international threat, adding to the wider 
struggles of the global antiterrorist coalition. This event also had a strong impact on 
a crucial, for an Egyptian state, branch of economy – tourism.
Nevertheless, a landscape of terrorist attacks in Sinai of 2015–2016 presented quite 
a systematic change in the tactic of a local Da’ish branch. Previously, they were as-
saulting military compounds, mainly some checkpoints, smaller military bases or secu-
rity posts; most likely when the Egyptian government decided to send reinforcements 
to the conflict zone, further attacks on the military positions started to cost the local 
Da’ish too much. So, because of this, terror cells have shifted their tactic and a turned 
the vector of their offensive actions to killing innocent people: first, those Egyptians 
who had any connections with the central government or the structures whose func-
tioning is necessary for efficient local administration. For instance, there was an as-
sault on some ambulance workers in Sinai (Fouad, 2016).
In 2016 an important question was asked: can Da’ish Wilayat in the Sinai Penin-
sula spread their actions and spill the wave of violence among other Egyptian regions? 
Any major local activity of terrorists from Da’ish was targeted mostly on Bedouins 
and some other tribes which stood in the opposition to the government. Even if some 
violence in Sinai could be observed, it was contained within a limited area; obviously, 
it is easier to use the armed forces and other security forces there. But a new challenge 
for Egypt in 2016 was a potential growth of numerous assaults in cities, primarily in 
Cairo, and rising terror in some of the key tourist resorts. Last year was full of ex-
amples of such terrorist activity. For instance, in January three foreign tourists were 
stabbed at the Hurghada hotel (BBC, 9.01.2016); in December 2016, a bomb exploded 
near the major route to the Giza Pyramids, often used by those who visit the world her-
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itage monuments (Elgood, 9.12.2016). Also in the same year, terrorists tried to attack 
security forces more often, and this was not limited to Sinai. Simultaneously, Islam-
ists targeted the Christian Coptic minority and the places connected to them and their 
religious practices (The Economist, 17.12.2016). For example, in December 2016, 
25 Egyptians were killed in a bomb blast near St Mark’s Cathedral in Cairo, one of the 
most important churches for Christians in this state (Al Jazeera, 11.12.2016).
Nevertheless, there are some doubts as to who was fully responsible for destabiliza-
tion in Egypt. Of course, the easiest answer in such a situation was to name Da’ish and 
it is necessary to mention that this organization openly claimed responsibility for many 
incidents and larger attacks. There is also another, not so internationally well-known 
Hasm “Popular Resistance” terrorist organization. The group, which was formed in 
2014, “first gained widespread attention in June 2015 when it claimed responsibility 
for the murder of the country’s chief prosecutor, Hisham Barakat, in Cairo” (Shay, 
19.03.2017). Hasm’s case is important for an understanding of the general situation 
in Egypt since they have been linked to some waves of attacks, mostly against gov-
ernment workers and security personnel in 2016. They could assume a new role of 
a bridge between the radical fractions in the Muslim Brotherhood and Da’ish Wilayat 
Sinai, thus significantly expanding the terror-prone Egyptian territory and ipso facto 
creating a contingency for more occasions to use force in internal policy, all along 
referring to the suspicion towards the Islamists.
SCENARIOS – In the future, Da’ish or Hasm might become a very effective tool, 
both for the current government in Cairo and for right now the most important official 
illegal opposition in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood. For the president Abdel-
Fattah al-Sisi and his armed forces or security institutions, any long-term operation in 
Sinai or counterterrorist operations against other terrorists is a visible sign that Egypt is 
a reliable partner for its international partners both from the West and from the Arabic 
Peninsula. Therefore, it will be possible for them to maintain some forms of the au-
thoritarian rule without a strong external resistance. In addition to this, another matter 
is the Coptic Church’s security problem, treating the present regime in Cairo as the 
last defense of religious diversity and a barrier between the modern world’s standards 
and the radical Sunni ideology – approaching them to a useful status quo ante which 
existed in the Hosni Mubarak’s years. For an internal situation in the country, such 
a continuity of domestic violence, strongly connected to terrorist activity, is an excuse 
for harsh law and the presence of the military units in major cities, thus blocking any 
occasion for a replay of some forms of popular uprisings, also in Cairo.
A continuation of the terrorist threat in Egypt gives many more possibilities for 
important foreign support (Sharp, 2017), mostly for some governmental projects, like 
building a security barrier on the border with Libya but also for other forms of em-
powering the armed forces, police, riot formations or even the most important – in-
telligence and counterintelligence. Still, a question remains how Egypt will benefit 
from a political and military cooperation with Saudi Arabia. A token of this relation is 
a participation of the Egyptian naval forces in a maritime blockade of Huthi in Yemen. 
In 2016, Egypt’s government also approved a deal to hand over two Red Sea islands to 
Saudi Arabia. However, this plan might have a strong impact on the internal opposition 
in the country which may gain a great opportunity to invoke the nationalist concepts. 
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Notwithstanding, that is a dangerous and risky policy for Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi. First, 
any terrorist incident in Egypt has had a real economic dimension to it, related to the 
fact that tourism is an important source of income. So, the best scenario for the Egyp-
tian government assumes that any terrorist activity will be pushed back to the Sinai 
Peninsula but without any forms of danger to the resorts located along the Red Sea 
coastline or major places of mass interest, like Giza.
On the other hand, terror is acceptable for the Muslim Brotherhood and the sup-
porters of the former president Mohamed Morsi. Any new casualties cause internal 
chaos and develop a sense of danger by weakening the security forces, as well as the 
President al-Sisi. However, the most important issue for them is the transfer of the se-
curity problems to the situation in the tourism sector because any shortcomings might 
have an impact on the state finance and an everyday life of the citizens. Of course, it is 
a well-known fact that pauperization brings more supporters to the political opposition 
and favors the occurrence of riots and demonstrations. Therefore, there is a high prob-
ability of a distributed violence in Egypt, even after curbing the activity of Da’ish.
The Crawling Decay of Libya
In hindsight, the situation in Libya in 2016 was perhaps even more complicated than in 
Somalia this same year. After 2011’s revolution and the Western military intervention, 
the state plunged into a deep and strong internal division. Without Muammar Gaddafi, 
Libyans have never organized any efficient government which would be able to con-
trol at least the capital; different groups and fractions normally use power against each 
other as they try to control major cities and strategic branches of the natural resources 
infrastructure. Unfortunately, a strong presence of various terrorist organizations has 
an impact on an increasing level of violence in the country – robbery in huge weapons 
stores favored it. Therefore, Libya has become a typical example of a fragile state 
which projects its negative impact on almost all neighboring states – for instance, as 
a strategic part of the migration crisis from Africa to Europe because of a permanent 
lack of border controls.
In 2016 in Libya, two major contractual front lines could be observed. The first 
one was a vital part of anti-Daish or wider anti-terrorist struggles in the MENA region. 
On one side stood a loose coalition of militias controlled by moderate leaders; on the 
other side stood Da’ish Wilayat and Jihadist groups connected e.g. with Al Qaeda. 
Numerous Jihadi fighters have been present in Libya and have taken part in the fights 
since the beginning of the revolution against Muammar Gaddafi, mostly because the 
old regime in Tripoli has lost its control over prisons where they were detained. It is 
necessary here to underline that the former Libyan dictator started a cooperation with 
the Western intelligence agencies after 9/11 attacks and the US Iraq invasion, to fight 
the Islamist groups. The radical Islamists used internal chaos like in Syria or Iraq to 
create their own militia units: first, of course, to collaborate on a tactical field with the 
opposition in a struggle with Gaddafi and his allies. In this phase of the war, from the 
opposition’s side, they were useful for their actions characterized by fanaticism. But, 
after their final victory, Islamists aimed at a creation of a strict and harsh religious 
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state based on Sharia law. So, they never decided to disarm or join in the attempt of 
the unification process; they even started their own campaign against former coalition 
forces and the Western presence in Libya. A clear expression of this terror policy was 
an attack on the US consulate in Benghazi in September 2012 in which the US Ambas-
sador was killed.
A new quality of terrorist activity came to Libya after 2014, with the beginning 
of the presence of the first formal Da’ish terrorist cells on this territory. Their origins 
are mostly related to the creation of the al-Battar Brigade in 2012 but only the Da’ish 
supporters, probably based on the patterns checked in Syria, started a new wave of Ji-
hadist strategy. They wanted to link traditional terrorist operations targeted at Western-
ers and moderated forces with a classical territorial expansion based on paramilitary 
militia units. Since 2015, Da’ish have “built on an existing presence in the eastern 
city of Derna, a long-time jihadist hub, where groups active pledged allegiance to IS 
and took over local administration buildings” (BBC, 11.01.2016). Afterwards, they 
started a larger offensive which effected in, for example, taking control over Sirte in 
2015. At the same time, Da’ish increased their presence in Libya and their enemies 
felt threatened so, mainly in 2016, varied Libyan internal fractions began a massive 
counteroffensive against the terrorist strongholds to retake Sirte and 150 miles of the 
Mediterranean coastline (Wintour, 5.12.2016). The main reason for so many Libyan 
groups to join in this operation was related to a potential threat that the Jihadists could 
gain an access to the country’s natural resources which were, and still are, the pillars 
of Libyan economy and without them, no future government can build their power. 
After a heavy fighting with the Da’ish militias, moderate fractions seized the majority 
of important cities by the end of 2016. An important role in this victorious operation 
was played an external support, for instance from the US Air Force.
Still, any strategic conventional defeats of Da’ish in Libya in 2016 cannot cover 
the fact that there is still a significant number of functioning Jihadi organizations in 
Libya. Last year, the Ansar al-Sharia group was very active in Ganfuda, southwest 
Benghazi; heavy fighting with the troops from the so-called Libyan National Army 
(LNA) ensued. It is necessary to highlight that this terrorist organization is linked to 
a very influential regional Al Qaeda of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) but they still keep the 
connection with al-Mourabitoun, a splinter group from AQIM. But besides Da’ish or 
AQIM supporters, the presence of other radical Salafist groups was noticeable in Libya 
in 2016 (Pack, 7.06.2017). They positioned themselves between the moderate forces 
and both terrorist organizations. For instance, some of the militia faithful to Sadeq al-
Ghariani, Libya’s Grand Mufti, could be seen as fully equipped Islamists with a radical 
vision of the future of Libya but without a strong external pressure to be delegitimized 
or destroyed. Because of it, perhaps, they are more dangerous right now than Da’ish, 
since they can use military tools based on paramilitary units, religious indoctrination, 
and political actions on weak public institutions.
An overall level of security and stability in post-revolutionary Libya depends not 
only on violent struggles with terrorists. The other field of rivalry is directly conjunct 
to a new map of aspirations of some political and military leaders. Several types of ac-
tors scramble for power in today’s Libya: “armed groups; ‘city-states’, particularly in 
western and southern Libya; and tribes, which are particularly relevant in central and 
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eastern Libya” (Toaldo, 2017). This multilayered political and military situation made 
ground for a concept of a new, strong-handed ruler, as the leader of Libya. Therefore, 
2016 witnessed further efforts in this direction, mostly from the general Khalifa Haftar. 
Officially, he is a chief of the armed forces, loyal to the internationally recognized gov-
ernment of Libya – the so-called Libyan National Army ‘LNA’. Practically, last year 
he led a very autonomous and independent policy regarding the internal situation in the 
country and in the field of relations with other foreign state actors. Obviously, what he 
used was a weak position of the Tripoli Libya’s Government of National Accord ‘GNA’ 
to promote his leadership as a response to security problems. For instance, last year 
he had refused to cooperate with an internationally recognized government until they 
took control over the self-directed militias around the state (Irish, 20.05.2016). Simul-
taneously, the fights in Benghazi or Sirte continue and the influences in East Libya are 
being strengthened, thanks to a power center in Tobruk; while looking for his moves, 
he receives political and military support from Russia (The Guardian, 29.11.2016), 
mostly to balance the involvement of France and the US in the Libyan conflict.
SCENARIOS – To summarize, unfortunately, the events from 2016 do not promise 
anything good for the coming years. Of course, a hypothesis that Libya will become 
a safe-haven for major terrorists from Da’ish after their general withdrawal from Syria 
and Iraq was much exaggerated because, with a collapse of Sirte, they suffered a loss 
of conventional strategic initiative. However, Da’ish and other Jihadist organizations 
will have an impact on the conflict in Libya since there have been many people who 
support radical Islam’s vision for the state since 2011. Terrorists can also use strong di-
visions and differences among their political rivals in Libya to their advantage, mostly 
to maintain a net of smaller but dangerous cells and even militia formations, hiding 
their activities behind internal instability.
On one hand, further presence of Da’ish or Ansar al-Sharia will bring more for-
eign military operations in Libyan territory, including actions of the Special Opera-
tions Forces from the US or France and Egypt but, perhaps, also some problematic air 
strikes. It might have a direct impact on the local population and their attitude to the 
weak central government in Tripoli. This will mostly result in a rising negative recep-
tion of the western states and their allies on the ground. On the other hand, none of the 
major Libyan political actors wants to focus their forces on the fight with Jihadists due 
to the fear of weakening of the internal political position. However, in the next years, 
the greatest risk can be the penetration of local political institutions by some radical 
Islamists who have not had any direct connections with major terrorist organizations. 
Their long-term policy could block any moderate vision for the new Libya.
Political ambitions of, for instance, the general or even the marshal Haftar suggest 
that any UN-backed or other international forms of peaceful agreements can be very 
easily blocked by a form of an internal military coup. The long-term activity of nu-
merous militias, in combination with a deepening economic crisis, create a very good 
opportunity to unify the state by the armed forces, creating an authoritarian regime. 
We cannot neglect a role of external players in Libyan policy. Not only from the West’s 
perspective – the UK, France, Italy, the US, etc., a new balance of power in this North 
African state is an important part of their actions. For example, Libya’s game is being 
played by the governments of Russia and Egypt right now.
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For Europe, the conflict in Libya has another important factor to consider; perhaps 
even more crucial than terrorism or destabilization of a role of a traditional natural 
resources exporter. It is the migration problem and the role of Libya’s territory and its 
coastline in the generation of a new wave of people who try to cross the Mediterranean 
Sea. The former dictator Gaddafi fully controlled the migration paths leading to Italy 
because he knew well enough the true value of the fears of illegal immigrants in the 
West. Nonetheless, since 2011 the internal situation has opened new ways for smug-
gling people from Africa to Europe This was reflected in the 2015’s crisis and after the 
EU agreements with Turkey; truth be told, Libya remains the biggest threat. This, in 
particular, is a chance for different Libyan militias to make a lot of money. Therefore, 
a lack of stabilization in Libya in 2017 will eventually shift to a bigger problem across 
the EU.
AQIM Strategy for a Long-term War in Mali
While the international community has generally been focusing on counterterrorism 
operations against Da’ish’s supporters in the MENA region, other organizations have 
been regrouping and carrying out their own campaigns in Sahel and other parts of 
Africa. At the turn of 2015/16, such a new-old role was played by the Al Qaeda of 
Islamic Maghreb AQIM which developed new quality in its own activity. The first 
signal was clearly connected to the terrorist attack which happened at the end of 2015. 
AQIM, in cooperation with other group known better as the Al-Mourabitoun, stormed 
the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, the Malian capital. This attack “signaled a declara-
tion of unity between both groups. Al-Mourabitoun has since taken the lead in AQIM 
operations, including a high-profile attack on a U.N. base in northern Mali” (Counter 
Extremism Project 2). In 2016, major non-Da’ish Jihadi organizations in North-West 
Africa ceased open competition initiated by the division in late 2012. The result of this 
was a series of deadly attacks in various states, like the one which happened in January 
2016 in Burkina Faso or the other in March 2016 in Côte d’Ivoire.
The AQIM and its affiliated groups concentrate on three general operational fields. 
The first one is a typical guerrilla warfare against the local armed forces and other se-
curity formations. But of course, when the international coalition led by France decid-
ed to intervene in 2012 after the Malian coup d’état in this country, Jihadists targeted 
also foreign soldiers. In 2016, a series of ambushes in Mount Sammama area of Kas-
serine Governorate followed. Terrorists from the local branch of AQIM generally used 
an IED’s to stop Tunisian or other military columns; after that, they used small arms 
to attack soldiers (Weiss 1, 1.09.2016). This tactic assumes an increase in the number 
of casualties among foreign military personnel deployed to Mali or neighboring states. 
Therefore, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in 
Mali MINUSMA, established in 2013, has become one of the most compromised op-
erations in Africa. In 2016, the international forces from MINUSMA and other mis-
sions were repeatedly attacked by terrorists and suffered casualties. Methods used by 
AQIM or other groups are similar to those already observed in Iraq or Afghanistan. For 
instance, they fired Grad rocket against the French military compound located in Tim-
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buktu or stormed military positions with a combination of suicide bombers or vehicles 
and groups of riflemen. It is worth noting that in one such attack in Gao, a Chinese 
peacekeeper was killed.
The second form of terror activity, used in 2016 by AQIM, Al-Mourabitoun, etc. 
were attacks against civil targets, not directly connected with the military or security 
forces in the region. Until November 2016:
“Mali and the wider West African region have seen at least 228 al Qaeda-linked 
attacks. Much of these have occurred in Mali’s north, but over 40 have been in the 
southern part of the country. At least 19 incidents have occurred in neighboring states 
such as Niger, Burkina Faso, Algeria, and even the Ivory Coast. This represents a sig-
nificant increase in the al Qaeda-led insurgency in northern Mali since last year, 
which has also spilled over the borders more frequently than the prior two years” 
(Weiss 2, 30.11.2016).
In this context, we saw a real danger for hotels, tourist attractions and the infrastructure 
related to the regional pillars of the economy.
Terrorists try to gain new sources of funding by typical criminal actions and this is 
the third form of activity of the AQIM and its affiliates. Therefore, Jihadists want to 
control smuggling routes in the entire region which are later used to redeploy e.g. peo-
ple, cigarettes (like a famous terrorist leader – emir Mokhtar Belmokhtar), weapons 
etc. An important part of such activity is also kidnaping foreign citizens and forcing 
high ransoms from individuals, families, private sector or even states. In January 2016 
some “missionaries were kidnapped in Mali and Burkina Faso, in October another 
(American) missionary/NGO worker was grabbed near Abalak, south of Agadez in 
Niger, on Christmas Eve 2016 a French NGO worker was abducted in Gao and a nun 
was also grabbed in Mali” (Sahara, 02.2017). A very important signal for the security 
situation in the region is that all forms of activity in 2016 revealed cross-border chal-
lenges that cannot be solved by a single state or even a multinational intervention in 
one state.
Therefore, mostly France tries to employ a holistic spectrum of military operations 
which will cover the entire region – Operation Barkhane is of a major importance here. 
It “began in August 2014, when France reorganized Operation Serval and a concurrent 
28-year-old mission in Chad called Operation Épervier into a unified counterterrorism 
mission consisting of more than 3,500 French troops across Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, 
Mauritania, and Niger” (Powell, 1.02.2016). They use a combination of their own ki-
netic, direct operations against some high valued targets together with the AQIM and 
other Jihadists, generally carried out by special operations forces supported by French 
helicopters and military or intelligence airplanes deployed into Sahel states. Also, 
training and assistance to support local formations of armed forces in their struggles 
with terrorists were provided. Unfortunately, no efficient military operations can solve 
the problems based on dysfunctional governments, borders disputes or the exclusion 
of the whole ethnic groups like Tuaregs in Northern Mali.
SCENARIOS – Since a new wave of violence and other forms of activity affiliated 
with the AQIM in Sahel in 2016, doubts have arisen regarding the long-term stabil-
ity in the region. In contrast to Da’ish in Syria or Libya, the Jihadists from Mali and 
its neighboring countries are aware that they are not able to reach their goals fast 
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right now if they use only conventional force; this is evident by the experience of 
Serval and Barkhane operations which left the AQIM to face the new tactic based on 
a combination of small operations, similar to Afghanistan, targeted at foreign troops 
and increasing the frequency of terrorist attacks against popular sites in major cities. 
Any new casualties among foreign troops, mostly from the West or even China, will 
have an impact on the attitude of the society and the politicians, and also on the will to 
continue the operations in Sahel. On the other hand, new high-profile attacks in cities, 
on the industrial infrastructure or tourist resorts will guarantee a better position in the 
global Jihadi movement in contrast to Da’ish and provide not only new recruits but 
also financial support to their organization.
For the international community, the situation in Mali and other regional states is 
a great opportunity to test a new approach to peacekeeping operations in the era of ter-
ror in Africa. These need to have a dual form because they cannot be constructed only 
on, even the most efficient, military action but also must involve a diplomatic form of 
discussion about the purposes of such regional destabilization. Unfortunately for the 
French foreign policy, it is more useful or plausible to accept some risky operations 
against terrorists but without a wider stabilization of Sahel; weaker Sahel states are 
better partners when it comes to the discussion about trade, natural resources or the 
presence of the foreign business in their territory. The present involvement of China 
in e.g. Mali can only further strengthen this view among the former colonial leaders, 
such as France.
Boko Haram and Success without Final Victory
However, in modern Africa there is also some other terrorist organization which ac-
tions symbolizing a highest level of brutality and cruelty, and it is Boko Haram. In 
2009, they officially began a military and terror campaign to impose Islamic govern-
ment in Nigeria. Their initial strongholds were located mostly in the north-eastern 
parts of country, for instance in Yobe or Borno districts and of course Sambisa forest. 
But, during the following years they have expanded own operations beyond Nigerian 
territory and threatened civil population in Niger, Chad and Cameroon. In 2014, “ac-
cording to data collected by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), it was the world’s 
most deadly terrorist entity” (Mahmood, 2017). But, Boko Haram became much more 
famous, on a global scale, since 2014 after the attack on Chibok school. After this well-
known hostage incident, most important world players, headed by US, put a strong 
pressure on government from Abuja to organized efficient counterterrorist operation 
against Boko Haram. This effect has been strengthened by information that Boko Har-
am and its leader Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance in March 2015 to Da’ish.
Regarding to these events and because of repeated terrorist attacks in various 
parts of Nigeria central government focused more attention on military operations 
against Jihadists. Therefore in 2016 at least we saw some progress in fights mostly in 
Nigeria where armed forces and security agencies retook control over some Nigerian 
regions previously controlled by Boko Haram. They also tried to build local self-
defense system based on agreements with regional leaders whose were in opposition 
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to Boko Haram. But, perhaps most visible turning point is dated on last part of 2016 
when Nigerian forces started operation in Sambisa forest. So, in a place which had 
been a terrorist bastion for years and which was used to training and preparing at-
tacks in the whole country (The Telegraph, 24.12.2016). Regarding to these events 
and because of repeated terrorist attacks in various parts of Nigeria central govern-
ment focused more attention on military operations against Jihadists. Therefore in 
2016 at least we saw some progress in fights mostly in Nigeria where armed forces 
and security agencies retook control over some Nigerian regions previously control-
led by Boko Haram.
But last year a Nigerian Jihadist movement was weakened not only by efficient 
military campaigned but also by internal problems resulting from the power struggles. 
In August 2016, the crack became very obvious when the Daesh named Abu Musab 
al-Barnawi, as the new leader of Boko Haram. The long-time leader of the group, 
Abubakar Shekau, denied he had been replaced and vowed to continue the insurgency 
(Onuoha, 27.11.2016). Therefore, after 2016 present capabilities of divided organiza-
tion is much lower than ever before.
But it’s necessary to mentioned here that not only Nigerian government has bought 
during last years a lot of new equipment for army mainly to defeated terrorist and 
invest in own military capability. Positive signals came also from Chad or Cameroon 
which want to secure a situation on borderlands with Nigeria. Present fights against 
Boko Haram is strongly supported by some external partners. For instance, in 2016 
US resumed professional training program as a part of strategy against the terror group 
and, part of the new deal the Obama administration entered with President Muham-
madu Buhari (Olorunyomi, 12.02.2016). Like they are constantly cooperating with 
Chad on counterterrorism filed for example with cyclical special operations forces 
maneuvers Flintlock. And on the base of US AFRICOM build other forms of regional 
counterterrorism cooperation.
SCENARIOS – Hitherto activity of Boko Haram put this organization on the list of 
the most dangerous world terrorist groups in history. But their successful campaign 
of violence during the last years drew more attention on them from the states govern-
ments and international organizations. So, even despite the Nigeria didn’t overcome 
major problems inside their military like the corruption, external and internal pressure 
was too strong not to start large scale counterterrorism operations against Boko Haram 
strongholds. Because of it Jihadists lost some previous operational capabilities and 
they were pushed into the strategic defensive. But unfortunately, they still have ef-
fective background to organize some attacks in Nigeria or in Cameroon. But they are 
characterized by a smaller magnitude and they are not so bloody than before. If present 
Nigerian, Chadian, or Cameroonian authorities will use a last year split inside Boko 
Haram they might have a great opportunity to marginalized this organization. And in 
long-term perspective fully retaking a permanent control over the most dangerous ter-
ritories of their own countries. But any achievements may be lost very quickly without 
implementing some structural programs directed to local population and people who 
left territories previously controlled by terrorists. But after 2016, international com-
munity is much closer to defeat Boko Haram than to do this same in case of Al Qaeda 
or Da’ish.
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ABSTRACT
The first part of this article provides an overview of the development of entrenched armed 
conflicts in Sub Saharan Africa which continue or have resurfaced in 2016. The author (JVdB) 
aims to expose the underlying causes and nature of the violent contestation by drawing of the 
works of C. T. Call in order to break open the black box of ‘failed states’ and analyze their legiti-
macy, capacity and security gaps separately. In addition the author will provide short scenarios 
of how these conflicts are likely to evolve in the short and medium-term and which (structural) 
factors will dominate these trends. The second part of this article (by JR) mainly aims at pre-
senting the basic preconditions for the activities of the major terrorist organizations in Africa. 
With emphasis on the importance of the north-east and north-west regions of this continent in 
context of terrorist threats. Hence the initial focus was put on Somalia, which as a permanent 
fragile state remains under the increased influence of the Jihadist organization Al Shabaab, 
which is an organization with a high potential for increased capacity in the coming years. Next, 
was sketched out the situation in Egypt, considering, in essence, the activity of the so-called 
Islamic State in Sinai Peninsula. In this Analysis it also pointed to the intricate internal situation 
in modern Libya after so-called Arab Spring and international military intervention, where, de-
spite earlier appearances, the terrorist threat was too much positioned, mostly by comprised to 
the internal conflict between the different Libyan political parties. Finally, efforts were made to 
illustrate the current terrorist activity in the Mali area, highlighting the importance of Al Qaeda 
branch AQIM and the situation in Nigeria where Boko Haram group operates.
 
Keywords: Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda of Islamic Maghreb, Angola, AQIM, Boko Haram, CAR, 
Congo (Brazzaville), Da`ish, so-called Islamic State
KONFLIKTY ZBROJNE W AFRYCE: PAŃSTWA KRUCHE I ROSNĄCA  
NIESTABILNOŚĆ 
 
STRESZCZENIE
W pierwszej części artykułu zaprezentowano przegląd wybranych konfliktów zbrojnych 
w Afryce Subsaharyjskiej, które toczyły się lub wybuchły ponownie w 2016 r. Autor (JVdB) 
postawił sobie za cel wskazanie przyczyn i charakteru brutalnych sporów, przede wszystkim 
poprzez odwołanie się do prac C. T. Call`a. Dążąc tym samym do rozpatrzenia dylematów 
związanych z “państwami upadłymi”, analizy problemu legitymizacji władzy, czy też poprzez 
określenie głównych możliwości oraz dysfunkcji z zakresu bezpieczeństwa, w szczegółowo 
rozpatrywanych przypadkach. Ponadto, Autor sformułował także scenariusze, starając się wy-
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wnioskować jak omawiane konflikty mogą ewoluować zarówno w perspektywie krótko jak 
i średnioterminowej. Próbując równocześnie odpowiedzieć na pytanie, które czynniki (struk-
turalne) zdominują ogólne tendencje zmian w regionie. W drugiej części artykułu (przez JR) 
postawiono sobie cel jakim jest przedstawienie uwarunkowań w zakresie aktywności najważ-
niejszych organizacji terrorystycznych w Afryce. Ze szczególnym podkreśleniem znaczenia 
rejonu północno-wschodniego oraz północno-zachodniego tego kontynentu. Stąd wstępne 
skupienie uwagi na obszarze Somalii, która jako państwo słabe pozostaje pod wzmożonym 
wpływem tamtejszej dżihadystycznej organizacji Asz Szabaab, co więcej organizacji o dużym 
potencjale w zakresie wzrostu możliwości działania w kolejnych latach. Następnie dokonane 
zostało zarysowanie sytuacji w przypadku Egiptu, uwzględniając w głównej mierze aktywność 
tzw. Państwa Islamskiego na Synaju. Wskazano także na skomplikowaną sytuację wewnętrzną 
w Libii, gdzie jednak wbrew pozorom zagrożenie terrorystyczne było zbyt mocno pozycjono-
wane, chociażby względem wewnętrznego konfliktu pomiędzy zróżnicowanymi stronnictwami 
politycznymi. Finalnie spróbowano dokonać zobrazowania obecnej aktywności terrorystycznej 
w rejonie Mali, podkreślając znaczenie AQIM oraz w rejonie Nigerii, gdzie funkcjonuje Boko 
Haram.
 
Słowa kluczowe: Al Kaida Islamskiego Maghrebu, Al Shabaab, Angola, AQIM, Boko Haram, 
CAR, Da`ish, tzw. Państwo Islamskie
